William & Mary Law Review
Volume 13 (1971-1972)
Issue 3

Article 3

March 1972

Estate and Gift Tax Reform: Inter Vivos Transfers with a
Testamentary Flavor
Don W. Llewellyn

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Part of the Taxation-Federal Estate and Gift Commons

Repository Citation
Don W. Llewellyn, Estate and Gift Tax Reform: Inter Vivos Transfers with a Testamentary Flavor,
13 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 553 (1972), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol13/iss3/3
Copyright c 1972 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship
Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr

ESTATE AND GIFT TAX REFORM.
INTER VIVOS TRANSFERS WITH
A TESTAMENTARY FLAVOR
DON W

LLEWELLYN*

THE DOUBLE TAXATION PROBLEM

As soon as the Ways and Means Committee has a chance to get to
it, there will be more estate and gift tax reform. The Committee's
sense of urgency has been tempered as a result of the Secretary of the
Treasury's lack of enthusiasm for reform at this time. However, the
Committee has been exposed to extensive studies made by the American Law Institute1 and the Treasury Department.2 The scope and
timing of reform are still very unsettled, but in spite of rather basic
conflicts, even within the Treasury, it can be said that by any standard
the reform will be major.' This article will discuss the need for reform where a transfer is made in contemplation of death or with the
retention of either a beneficial interest in or a power over the transferred property In addition, these subjects will provide an interesting
vantage point from which to examine estate and gift tax reform
generally
Under present law, there are several situations where transferred
property will be included in the transferor's gross estate even though
the transfer was complete for gift tax purposes and, therefore, subject to gift tax.4 This anomaly is caused by the use of different and
very esoteric standards under the estate tax from those used in the
gift tax for answering the question: Has the transferror sufficiently
divested hinself of the transferred property so as not to be considered
the owner thereof for tax purposes? The confusion is further compounded because almost all of these "string transfers" are made in
trust, and the standards set forth in the grantor trust income tax pur•* BA., Dickinson College, 1957; J.D., Dickinson Law School, 1961; LL.M., New York
Umv. School of Law, 1967 Visiting Professor of Law, Syracuse Umv. School of Law.
1. ALI, FEDERAL EsrATz AND GnT TXAoN (1969) [hereinafter cited as ALI PaojEar].
2. U.S. TREAS. DEPT, 91sr CONG., isr Sass., TAX REFolMW Surnaois A D PROPOsALS,
Pr. 3 (Comm. Print 1969) [hereinafter cited as TRFAs. PRoposLS].

3. Secretary of the Treasury Connally stated that he favored the retention of the
dual tax and referred to the Treasury Proposal for a unified tax as a "staff proposal"
which was never adopted by the Treasury nor by the [Johnson] Administration.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1971, at 34, col. 1.
4. INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, §§ 2035-38, 2040.
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visions for determining severance of ownersip differ from both the

estate and gift tax.5 Chairman Mills of the Ways and Means Committee, in a speech prepared for delivery to the American Bankers
Association, pointed out that one of the goals of any reform would be
the virtual elimination of double taxation as a result of the same
transfer.6 A realistic and neccessary addition to that goal would be a
correlation of the estate, gift, and income tax provisions.
The nature of reform in this area must be considered within the
framework of the present dual transfer tax system and the Treasury
Proposal for a unified tax. The latter would extend the present system
of taxing gifts on a cumulative basis to include death transfers.7 Both
life and death transfers would be subject to the same tax rate, approximately twenty percent of the present estate tax rate, and the tax rate
at death would depend on the aggregate value not only of the value
of the estate at death but also on the total aggregate value of lifetime
and death transfers.8 In addition, the proposal contains a "gross-up"
feature for calculating the tax on lifetime transfers, 9 which will be explained later.
By eliminating the very considerable transfer tax savings inherent
in lifetime gifts under present law, the unified tax would certainly
decrease the motivation for attempting to fashion a testamentary objecuve into a lifetime gift. For example, the gift in contemplation of
death, the classic example of one transfer causing both a gift and an
estate tax to be imposed, would be virtually eliminated.1 However,
even under a unified tax the determination of the proper time when
the tax will be imposed (essentially the same question under the dual
5. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 671-77
6. The speech was never delivered but the text outline was printed in the N.Y. Times,
Oct. 13, 1970, at 25.
7. TREAs. PROPOSALS, supra note 2, at 355.
8. Id. at 355-56.
9. Id. at 355.
10. Tax avoidance under a unified tax by a gift in contemplation of death will
still exist with respect to insurance as a result of the retention of the incidents of ownership test. Tawis. PRoPosALs, suprd note 2, at 362. Therefore, the Treasury is proposing that the present treatment of insurance under INr. Rxv. CODE of 1954, § 2035
be retained with a modification to provide that
in addition to lifetime transfer tax, the deathtime transfer tax will be imposed upon the portion of life insurance proceeds equal to the increase
in cash value of the policy resulting from premiums paid during the 3
years preceding death plus the difference between the face amount of the
policy and its cash value at date of death.
TREAs. PRoPosALs, supra note 2, at 362.
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tax and which led to the double tax problem) must be resolved in
those instances where the transferor retains either a current beneficial
interest, a reversion, or some power over the beneficial enjoyment of
the property
The American Law Institute Study, a five year project completed
in 1968,11 includes resolutions for the double tax problem under both
a unified and dual tax system. The two proposals were necessary because the Institute was unable to reach a consensus on the adoption
of either a dual or unified tax.' 2 In this article an evaluation of the
unified and dual tax will be made by examining the capacity of both
systems to eliminate the problem of the double tax and establish an
understandable set of guidelines which will enable one to predict the
tax effects of routine or recurring transfer schemes. The latter goal
requires some attempt at coordinating the grantor trust provisions in
the income tax law, especially section 674, with the estate and gift
tax provisions.
CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH

The most obvious starting point in an exploration of the double tax
problem is the gift in contemplation of death. 13 Everyone, including
Chairman Mills, realizes that under a dual tax system there is no way
completely to avoid this problem. The considerable transfer savings
under the present law is a strong incentive for persons anticipating
death to make lifetime transfers. Not only is the gift tax rate only
three-quarters as high as the estate tax rate,' 4 but there is no tax at all
until the gift exceeds $30,000 ($60,000 for a husband and wife) 16
Even when the gifts exceed the specific exemption and the per donee
annual exclusion of $3,000, the gift is taxed at the bottom of the rate
schedule rather than being on top of the estate tax rate, as it would
be if the property were retained until death.
Even under a unified tax system there can be a slight tax advantage
in making an inter vivos gift rather than allowing that property to pass
at death. It is the same advantage that exists under the present dual tax
where the presumption of a gift in contemplation of death cannot be
rebutted and the value of the transferred property is included in the
11. See note 1 supra.
12. ALI PRojEcr, supra note 1, at 55-57
13. INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 2035.
14. Compare INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2001, with § 2502.
15. INT. REv. C DE of 1954, §§ 2503, 2521.

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13.553

gross estate. It results because a full credit for the gift tax paid is
applied against the estate tax' 6 without making any adjustment, in the
way of a gross-up, for the fact that the gift tax previously paid has
not been included in the gross estate.' 7 The American Law Institute
Proposal remedies this situation under the dual tax by eliminating the
credit and substituting a refund.' 8 In this way the taxes refunded
would be included in the gross estate. The Treasury Proposal for a
unified tax contains a gross-up feature that will cause the tax paid on
any lifetime transfer to be determined not solely on the basis of the
fair market value of the property transferred, but rather on the fair
market value of the property transferred plus the amount of the federal
transfer tax incurred on the transfer. 19 The American Law Institute
approach under a unified tax is much more moderate; it only requires
transfer taxes paid on lifetime transfers made in either of the two taxable periods prior to the transferor's death to be treated as death trans20
fers and be taxed accordingly,
It is clear that the adoption of a unified tax coupled with a gross-up
feature will virtually eliminate the considerable litigation that now
arises in this area of contemplation of death. This reduction of litigation alone, something that cannot be done under a dual tax, is a
persuasive argument in favor of the adoption of a unified tax.
POWERS TO AFFECT BENEFICIAL ENJOYMENT

Under present law, a gift tax is imposed when the transfer is complete. 21 A gift is not complete, even where the donor cannot regain
any interest in the property for himself, until that time when the
donor can no longer name new beneficiaries or change the interests of
beneficiaries between themselves. 22 The estate tax is imposed where
the donor has the power at death to affect the beneficial enjoyment of
the property 2 3 While the controlling question for both taxes is the
same, the answer under many circumstances is not. This sharply frus16. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, S 2013.

17. Under the present estate tax law the assets used to pay the tax are included
in the gross estate. See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, 5 2033. The assets used to pay gift
tax are not included in the value of the gift. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2503(a).
18. ALI PRojEcr, supranote 1, at 45.

19. TREAs. PaoposALs, supranote 2, at 355.
20. ALI PojEcr, supra note 1, at 45.
21. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511 (1954).
22. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2 (c) (1954).
23. Ir. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2038.
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trates two common goals of any tax: predictability for routine transactions and uniform treatment for transfers that only vary in form
rather than substance. The overwhelming majority of these transfers
whereby some control over beneficial enjoyment is retained are made
to a trust, and thus involve as a third set for guidelines to test severance
of ownership, the grantor trust income tax rules referred to earlier. 2 '
The lack of correlation between the latter provisions and the transfer
taxes cannot be justified on the grounds that trust income taxation is
fundamentally different from transfer taxation because the basic factor
for all is the transferor's control. In fact, in 1955 the American Law
Institute drafted a tentative statute establishing a correlated scheme
for grantor trust income, estate and gift taxation by which estate and
gift taxation would have depended directly upon the taxability of the
grantor under the income tax.25
The lack of correlation between the three taxes can be best illustrated by an analysis of the tax treatment of four rather routine transfers to a trust. Examples:
A transfers to T, an unrelated party, 20 shares of stock to hold
in trust and pay the income to B, A's son, until he reaches age 35,

then to pay the corpus to B. A retains the power to instruct the
trustee to pay any part or all the corpus to B before reaching age
35. Note that A's retained power is merely the power to accelerate B's vested interest. This mere power to affect the time of
enjoyment of an interest already vested does not prevent a gift
from being complete. 26 Nor does it cause the settlor to be taxed
on the trust mcomeYr On the other hand, the entire value of the
corpus and probably the entire value of the income interest as well
will be included in the gross estate of A if he dies before B reaches
35 without having fully executed or relinquished the power.2 8
A transfers 10 shares of stock to himself and his adult son B in
trust for B for life, remainder to D, the nephew of B and grandson
of A. A retains the power, in conjunction with B, to invade cor24. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §5 671-77
25. ALI FFD. I coME TAx STAT. S X2012 (a) (Draft 10,

1955).

26. Treas. Reg. S 25.2511-2(d) (1954). "A gift is not considered incomplete, however, merely because the donor reserves the power to change the manner or time of
"
enjoyment
27. See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, S 674(b) (5) (B); Treas. Reg. S 1.674(b)-1(b) (5) (ii)
(1956).

28. Lober v. United States, 346 US. 335 (1953); Treas. Reg. 5 20.2038-1(a) (3)
(1954).
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pus for the benefit of D. Since the power over the corpus retamed by A can only be exercised in conjunction with B, an adverse party, the gift is complete29 and in addition A will not be
taxed on the trust income.3 0 On the other hand, if A predeceases
B, the entire value of the property will be included in A's gross
estate. 3 '
A declares himself trustee of 20 shares of stock for his son, B,
for life, then to his grandchildren D and E. A retained the power
as trustee to pay during the life of B the income or any portion
thereof to D and E if required for educational purposes. Since
the power to distribute income to D and E is held in a fiduciary
capacity and subject to an ascertainable standard, the gift of income and corpus is complete32 and no portion of the property
will be included in the grantor's gross estate.33 On the other hand,
the power to control the disposition of income, even if limited
by an ascertainable standard, will cause the income to be taxable
to the grantor unless the power is exercisable by a trustee other
34
than the grantor or his spouse.
A transfers 20 shares of stock to W, his wife, in trust, the income to be distributed by W among B, C, or D, as she may determine, the remainder to E. There is no attempt under either
estate or gift taxation to impute to the grantor powers held by
another, no matter how subservient to the grantor that other party
may be.3 5 On the other hand, the grantor trust provisions do
impute to the grantor, in varying degrees, powers held by another depending on the relationship of the holder and the extent
of the power.3 6 Of course, in this case the power held by the
37
spouse causes the grantor to be taxed on the income of the trust.
Some sound arguments have been advanced in support of the distictions set forth in the above examples. However, the estate tax
29.

Camp v. Comm'r, 195 F.2d 999 (1st Cir. 1950); Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(e) (1954).
30. Treas. Reg. § 1.672(a)-I (c) (1956) clearly indicates that B is an adverse party
and Irr. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 674(a) excepts powers held in conjunction with an
adverse party.

31. Helvering v.City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U.S. 85 (1935); INT. REv. CODE
of 1954, § 2038(a) (1); Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-1(a)(3) (1954).
32. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1954). See Jennings v. Smth, 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir.
1947).
33. Jennings v. Smith, 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1947).
34. See NTIr. REv. CoDE of 1954, §§672-76.
35. W WARaEN & S. SuRRY, FEDERAL EsrATE AND GiFT TAx 406 (1961); INT. REv.
CODE of 1954, § 2036, 2038; Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2 (1954).
36. INT.Rrv. CoDE of 1954, §§ 672-76.
37. INT.REV. CODE of 1954, § 674.
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consequences in the first example, although the product of a Supreme
Court decision, cannot be supported by anything other than an extremldy literalistic reading of the statute.3 8 The estate tax will not pernut the recognition for tax purposes of the neutralizing effect on a
power where it must be exercised in conjunction with an adverse
party. This is illustrated in the second example. The result is said to
be predicated upon the fear that under any other rule the transferor
could easily avoid the estate tax by joining in the exercise one who
would comply in spite of an adverse interest3 9 The same fear of abuse,
probably regarded as acute because the power is directly related to the
tax, is the obvious reason advanced for the income tax treatment in
the third example, which results from a refusal to give the usual neutralizing effect to an ascertainable standard where the power to distribute income is in the grantor or his spouse. The questionable benefits derived from retaining the distinctions set forth above ought to be
weighed against the considerable confusion and uncertainty inherent
in even the most routine transfers.
In any event, it is obvious, after closely examning the examples set
forth above, that the double tax problem in the powers area could be
eliminated by simply providing that a gift will not be complete for
gift tax purposes in any situation where because of a retention of a
power over the beneficial interest in the property, it would be included in the grantor's gross estate. The imposition of any transfer
tax could either be postponed until the grantor's death or incurred
earlier if the power were exercised or relinquished. It is just as obvious
that coupled with the above there should be a provision causing powers
conferred by the grantor upon parties related and subservient to be
imputed to the grantor. The combined effect of Resolutions 23 and
25 of the American Law Institute is a major move in that direction.
These read as follows:S8. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §2038(a) provides that
the value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property
(1) [Nio the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has
., where the enjoyment thereof was
at any time made a transfer
subject at the date of his death to any change through the exercise of a
power
, to alter, amend, revoke or terminate
39. Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U.S. 85 (1935). Since 1924 the
statute expressly reaches transfers if enjoyment wa" subject t6 a power to alter, amend,.
or revoke exercisable by the decedent alone or in conjunction with any person. Before
that the rule was otherwise. Relnecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339 (1929).
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23. A line between completed and mcompleted gifts should be
definitely established, so that all lifetime arrangements would fall
on one side of the line or the other, and so that there would be
no area where the same transfer is subject to transfer taxation both
as a lifetime transfer and a deathtime transfer, under either a dual
tax system or a unified tax.
25. Under a dual tax system, a hard to complete gift rule should
be adopted in the power cases which would prevent a lifetime
arrangement from being a completed gift if there is a power in
anyone to modify who takes or to modify when a beneficiary
takes, except that an otherwise completed gift would not be incomplete if the power is in one or more persons other than the
transferor and (a) is exercisable only by will or (b) such powerholder is treated as the owner of the transferred property for
transfer tax purposes or (c) not more than half the power-holders are in the related or subordinate category as defined by IRC
672.40 (Emphasis supplied).
The problems of correlation in the power area are not insoluble.
If the adoption of the American Law Institute proposal could be parlayed with the acceptance of a unified position under all three taxes
that any power which is either (1) subject to an ascertainable standard,
(2) exercisable in conjunction with an adverse party, or (3) limited to
modification of the time when the beneficiary takes shall have no tax
significance, the triple standard problem, as well as the double tax
problem, would in the power cases be virtually eliminated. 41 The
adoption of such a proposal would also be a major step toward the
elimination of the triple standard. The only appreciable difference between the estate or gift tax and sections 674 and 676 of the grantor
trust provisions would be that in section 674 there is imputed to the
42
settlor a power held by an independent trustee to add beneficiaries.
Thin position should be retained by section 674 in order to impede a
proliferation of taxable entities, a subject beyond the scope of this
article.
If the dual tax is replaced by a unified tax, then an easy-to-complete
gift tax rule, rather than a hard-to-complete gift tax rule, should be
40. ALI PRoj=er, supra note 1, at 45-46.
" would have to be removed
41. "
or to modify 'when a beneficiary takes
from resolution 25.
42. See INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, SS 674(b) (4), (7), 676(a).
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adopted in the powers cases. American Law Institute Resolution 24
reads as follows:
24. Under a unified tax an easy-to-complete gift rule should
be adopted in the powers cases which would eliminate the significance of a power in lifetime arrangements to prevent a completed gift unless (a) the power can be exercised in favor of the
transferor and (b) the power is exercisable by the transferor
alone or in conjunction with one who does not have a substantial
interest that would be adversely affected by the exercise of the
power.4 3
The Treasury study points out that an easy-to-complete transfer rule,
which it also recommends for adoption, can be made under a unified
tax because, unlike the present dual tax, regarding lifetime transfers as
complete does not invite any significant tax avoidance. 4
It is true that the unified tax is a very effective method of solving
the double tax problem in the powers cases. The crucial question, however, must be: Is it possible by making the modifications to the dual
tax referred to abbve, and the others that follow, to deal just as effectively with the double tax problem and at the same time achieve
a correlation with the grantor trust income tax provisions, something
which is not possible under the unified tax? Such a correlation would
permit a single tax standard for transfers to a trust.45
REVERSION

Under present law, if the transferor retains a reversion that has
slightly more than a one-m-twenty chance of becoming possessory, it
may cause a substantial increase in the value of his gross estate.46 This
may result even where the reversion does not descend but terminates
because of his death.47 The applicable 'estate tax section of the Internal Revenue Code, section 2037, provides that the gross estate
43. ALI PRojacr, supra note 1, at 45.
44. TaRa.s. PROPOSALS, supra note 2, at 386.

45. Under a unified tax, an easy-to-complete gift rule would be adopted m the
powers cases, and the rule could never be correlated with the grantor trust provisions
of INT. REv. CODE of 1954, S 674, since the guidelines there will have to be toward
.strct enforcement of an income tax on any grantor who retains substantial power.
46. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2037.
47. The crucial tme for valuing the reversion is immediately before the death Of
the decedent. hT. RFv. CODE of 1954,

S 2037(a) (2).

This is so even though the sur-

vival of the decedent is required for the reversion to take effect.
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includes property transfered by the decedent to the extent possession
or enjoyment of the property could be obtained only by surviving the
decedent and the decedent retained a reversionary interest (other than
in income alone) that immediately before his death exceeded five percent of the entire value of the property
The application of the section is well illustrated by an example contamed in the regulations:
The decedent transferred property in trust with the income payable to his wife for life and with the remainder payable to the
decedent or if he is not then living at his wife's death to his
48
daughter or her estate.
Commenting on this example, Leach and Logan note that
[i]f the decedent dies prior to his wife the entire value of the
property less the value of the wife's life interest will be included
in his gross estate. Note that this is the result in spite of the fact
that the reversionary interest was terminated when the decedent
predeceased his wife. The value of the reversion is determined
immediately before the transferor's death and would in this type
of case probably exceed five percent of the entire value of the
property Note also that the daughter's interest was only contingent upon the father predeceasing her mother; not upon the
daughter surviving her father. However, the regulations evidently
take the provision that a possession or enloyment could be obtained in spite of the fact that the interest was vested only by
surviving the decedent 49
Another example taken from Casner's Estate Planmng ° will further
demonstrate that the complexity of section 2037 is not visible except
to the arcane.
S creates a trust to pay income to A for life; on A's death to pay
the principal to S, if S is then living, otherwise to B, if B is then
living. At the death of S both A and B are living. Note that S
48. Treas. Reg. § 20.2037-1(e) (1954) (Ex. 3).
49. See B. L-acH & J. LoGAw, Furua INTE~isr AND ESTATE PLANNING 23 (Supp.
1962) for a full discussion on the question of whether INT. Rxv. CODE of 1954,

S 2037 is applicable where the interest will vest without surviving the decedent but
enjoyment cannot take place without surviving the decedent.
50. A. CAsNaa, Es ATE PLANNING 215 (3d ed. 1961) (Prob. 6.28).
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has two reversionary interests, one expressed and the other implied.
The implied reversion results from the requirement that B must
survive A. In determining whether the five percent test is met
the percentage chance of both reversionary interests becoming
possessory must be tested immediately before S's death and then
must be totaled.5 1 (Italics supplied).
In the process of the American Law Institute study six different
proposals for the elimination of the double tax problem under a dual
tax were considered. 52 All were aimed at fixing one time when a tax,
either estate or gift, would be imposed to the exclusion of the other.
The time at which the tax would be imposed varied under each alternative. These alternatives ranged from simply providing that where under
present law a double tax is imposed on the same transfer that only one
should be imposed5 3 to the adoption of entirely new standards for fixing the time when a transfer would be complete. The new standards
proposed varied, and included the adoption of 1) a rule which depends on the grantor's tax liability for the income;5 4 2) the easy-tocomplete gift rule proposed originally for a unified tax55 (with and
without modifications);56 and 3) a hard-to-complete gift rule which,
57
as explained earlier, was adopted for the powers cases.
The approach taken for the powers cases was not adopted for all
situations. Rather, a combination of the above alternatives was selected
by the Institute, to be applied depending on the nature of the transfer.
The Institute's resolution for transfers where a reversionary interest
is retained provides:
The value of a reversionary interest retained by the transferor that
is certain to become possessory and of all succeeding interests,
should be considered an incomplete gift as long as such retained
interest is held by the transferor, under either a dual tax system
or a unified tax.55
51. See INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 2037 (a). The actuarial determinaions are made
by calculating the percentage chance that a person of S's age will survive a person
of A's age and adding that to the percentage chance that S and B will predecease A. _
52. ALI Pi ojEcr, supra note 1, at 191-98 (Reporter's study of Dual Tax Systems
and Unified Tax).
53. Id. at 196-97 (Alternative Nos. 4, 5).
54. Id. at 193 (Alternative No. 3).
55. Id. at 191 (Alternative No. 1).
56. Id. ae 192 (Alternative No. 2).
57. Id. at 198 (Alternative No. 6).
58. Id. at 46.
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When-this resolution is read in conjunction with the resoluton 9
wluch provides for a clear line between lifetime and death transfers,
it appears clear that the Institute was adopting an easy-to-complete gift
tax rulk for the reversion cases. Under present law, the value of a
reversionary interest, assuming that it can be established, is excluded
from the value of the taxable gift.60 Under the Institute Proposal
there would be no exclusion except where the reversionary interest
was certain to become possessory, and in that case not only the reversionary interest but all succeeding interests would be considered
incomplete until such time as the interest under the reversion ended or
6
was transfered. 1
More importantly, the American Law Institute Proposal spells the
repeal of section 2037 of the Internal Revenue Code. 62 Under the
Proposal the only situation where any estate tax will result from the
retention of a defeasible reversionary (one not certain to become possessory) interest is where the transferor resumes complete ownership
of the property under the reversion."8 Therefore, present law is altered
not only with respect to section 2037 but also with respect to section
2033. Under section 2033, the value of a descendible but defeasible
reversion is included in the gross estate.6 4 Although the changes have
the effect of subjecting to gift tax something which is not transfered
but retained (the defeasible reversionary interest) and at the same
time freeing from estate tax an interest which descends at death (a
defeasible but descendible reversionary interest), this approach is preferable to retaining the present law with all of its complexities. A close
examination of the apparent incongruous treatment set forth above
reveals that it is essentially a matter of deciding when the transfer will
be considered complete.
The retention by a transferor of a reversionary interest presents
basically the same problems under a umfied tax as exist under a dual
tax. For that reason, the solution set forth by the American Law Insti59. Id. at 45.
60. What is retained is obviously not transferred. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-i (1954).
The taxpayer has a difficult burden in valuing the reversion. See Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U.S. 184 (1943); TREAs. PROPOSALS, supra note 2, at 386.
61. ALI PRojEcr, supra note 1, at 46.
62. Id. at 118, 187 (Reporter's Study of Dual Tax Systems and Unified Tax).
63. Id. at 161.
64. The value of a reversionary interest certain to become possessory and all interests
-that follow that reversionary interest would be included in the gross estate. ALI
PaojEcr, supra note 1, at 46.
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tute is the same under both systems, and the Treasury Proposal for a
65
unified tax adopts the American Law Institute solution.
JOINT INTEREST

Under .present law, there is a built-in double tax problem with respect to a joint interest created by the gratuitous transfer of one of
the joint owners. On the creation, a gift tax is imposed on the value
of the interest transferred, and if the donor predeceases the donee the
entire value of' the property will be included in his gross estate. The
entire value of the property is included because under section 2040
of the Internal Revenue Code inclusion is determined on the basis of
contributions toward the acquisition of the property, not on the basis
of property interests passing at death. The contribution test requires
tracing, which is often difficult and sometimes impossible.
The American Law Institute proposes only a slight change in the
gift tax treatment. The change brings the creation of a tenancy by
the entirety by one of the spouses into line with the creation of any
other joint tenancy The proposal reads as follows:
The value that is received by a donee-joint-owner with the right
of survivorship, where the donor makes a gift at the time the joint
ownership was created, should be the value of his fractional interest, whether or not the right of survivorship is destructible by
the unilateral act of the donee-joint-owner, under either a dual
67
tax or a umfied tax.
The only joint tenancy where the right of survivorship is not de-

structible by the unilateral act of any joint owner is a tenancy by the
entirety. Under present law a gift made by a donor-tenant by the entirety is valued by an actuarial comparison of the life expectancy of, the
donor and donee tenant. 68 Under this method of valuation the younger
tenant is regarded as having the most valuable interest in the tenancy
The same difficult gift tax valuation problems exist where the joint
tenancy is terminated and the funds divided.6 9
The American Law Institute has proposed an entirely new scheme
65. TPYAss. PROPOSALS, supra note 2, at 386.
66. INT. Rv. CoDi of 1954, H§2511, 2040.

67. ALI PaojEcr, supra note 1, at 12.
68. Treas. Reg. 5 25.2515-2(b) (1954).
69. Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-4 (1954).
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for the estate taxation of all property held jointly with the right of
survivorship.
The amount of what is transferred on the death of a joint owner
should be his fractional interest, except where no gift was made
at the time the joint ownership was created, under either a dual
tax system or a umfied tax.70
It will be noted that the transfer test is not extended to real property
held as tenants by the entirety unless the creation of the tenancy was
treated as a gift in lieu of the non-gift tax treatment available under
section 2515. Otherwise, only half of the jointly held property would
be subject to tax at death, in spite of the fact that no transfer tax was
imposed on the creation of the tenancy 71
The Treasury Proposal for the treatment of concurrent interests
under a unified tax is in complete accord with the American Law Institute Resolution for eliminating the double tax problem with respect
to joint interests with the right of survivorship. 72 This, like the retention of reversionary interest cases presented earlier and the retention
of beneficial interest cases that follow, is another area where nothing
inherent in the nature of the unified tax enables the double tax problem to be solved with any more efficacy than under the dual tax.
RETENTION OF BENEFICIAL INTEREST

The double tax problem which occurs where a current beneficial
interest in transferred property is retained 73 is easily eliminated under
either a dual or unified tax simply by providing that such a transfer
is incomplete as long as the transferor retains the current beneficial
enjoyment. This solution was adopted by both the American Law
Institute and the Treasury 7 4 Where there is a retention of a noncurrent beneficial interest the tax treatment is controlled by the proposals relating to transfers where reversionary interests are retained
by the transferor. In addition, the retention of a reversion in the in70. ALI PRojEcr, supra note 1, at 12-14.
71. Id.
72. T&As. PROPOSALS, supra note 2, at 375.
73. If A transfers property to B but retains a life- estate, not only is the remainder
interest subject to gift tax but INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2036 causes the entire -interest

in the transferred property to be included in A's gross estate at death.
74. ALI PRojEcr, supra note 1, at 46; TREAs. PRoposALs, supra note 2, at 384.
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come alone is treated the same as a reversion in the fee. 75 Under present
law, a reversion in income only is not treated under section 2037 of
the Internal Revenue Code, but under section 2036.76 The treatment
,under the American Law Institute and Treasury Proposals can best
be contrasted with present law by the following example.
T transfers to A for life, then to T for life, remainder to B.
Under present law the value of the property transferred less the
77
value of the reversionary interest in T is subject to gift taxation.
The entire value of the property minus the value of A's life estate
will be included in the gross estate of T 78 Under the A.L.I. Proposal for a dual tax the entire value of the property transferred is
subject to a gift tax.79 The reversionary interest in the income is
ignored because it is not certain to become possessory No part of
the property will be included in T's gross estate on death.80
If the reversion in the income in the above example becomes possessory and is transferred, it will be subject to gift tax.8' However,
there is no way an estate tax will ever be imposed, because the life
interest will necessarily end on the death of the transferor. This type
of transfer is so obviously testamentary that it seems strange that it
escapes death tax. Although an additional gift tax is imposed on the
original transfer because of the refusal to permit the gift value to be
reduced by the value of the reversion, this may not be enough of an
increase in tax to offset the death tax savings. The reversion of a life
interest should be viewed as an aberration and treated independently
from the retention of current enjoyment cases and the reversion cases.
CONCLUSION

It is this writer's opimon that a comparison of the dual tax system
with the unified tax system with respect to the capacity of each to
solve the double tax problems ends in a stalemate. Inherent in the urn75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

ALI Paojpcr, supra note 1, at 161.
TNr. Rxv. CoDE of 1954, § 2037
ALIPIRojmar, supra note 1, at 161.
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2036.
ALI PRojEaCr, supra note 1, at 161.

80. It appears clear that this will be the result where T predeceases A. In view of
Resolution 23 of the American Law Institute, (supra note 40 and accompanying text)
it would also be the result if A predeceased T
81. ALI PaojEcr, supra note 1, at 161.
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fled approach is the removal of virtually all tax incentives for the making of inter vivos gifts. On the other hand, the magmtude of the
present incentives to rater vivos giving can, within the present dual
system, be reduced to a tolerable level and thus the uncertainty that
would necessarily accompany a change to a umfied system could be
avoided. A decision to modify the present dual tax in accordance with
the American Law Institute Resolutions and the other slight modificanons suggested in this article would not only solve the problem of
double taxation but would, in addition, provide a close correlation with
the grantor trust income tax provisions.
The Treasury study, which continually refers to the complexities
of the dual system as a reason for urging the adoption of a unified
tax, is quite misleading, because the complexities can be simplified
within a dual system. The American Law Institute, on the other hand,
properly focused on the issue when it stated in its final resolution:
[T] he primary justification for changing to a unified tax system
is to keep the rates on deathtime transfers by those who do not or
cannot make lifetime transfers at a lower rate than would be possi82
ble under a dual tax system.
If agreement cannot be reached on the vital policy questions involved in a decision to replace the dual tax with a unified tax, which
is a likely possibility considering the failure of both the American
Law Institute and the Treasury to reach an internal consensus, this
should not impede the enactment of the modifications herein proposed under the dual tax. Everyone agrees that these reform measures
are sorely needed.

82. Id. at 55-57

